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The aftermath of the VietNam war found many disabled veterans inca-
pable of readjusting to civilian life. The obvious obstacles confronting
them seemed insurmountable and, perhaps, at times they were. Their
struggle reawakened the American conscience to the problems of inte-
grating persons with physical and mental impairments into the main-
stream of society's activities. In order to accomplish this, however,
drastic measures had to be taken to address the existing discriminatory
practices aimed at the handicapped.' Reacting to such practices, Con-
gress enacted the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.2 Far reaching ramifica-
tions are implied by the Act's removal of physical and social obstacles
to education and employment for the handicapped.3 More particularly,
Section 5041 of that act prohibits any recipient 5 of federal funds from
1. Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 1027 (1971), defines "handi-
cap" as a "disadvantage that makes achievement unusually difficult". When used ge-
nerically, "handicap" has a narrower meaning, referring to a particular type of disad-
vantage: a mental, physical, or emotional disability or impairment. Handicapped is
both the accepted everyday meaning and a common statutory term of describing per-
sons having such difficulties.
2. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 395, 29 U.S.C. §
794 (1976), as amended by the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 Amendments of 1974, Pub.
L. No. 93-516, 88 Stat. 1617 (1974), and the Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Service,
and Developmental Disabilities Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, 92 Stat.
2955 (1978).
3. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 is a financial problem for the nation's schools
and colleges who are concerned with the cost required to provide equal access for a
minority of handicapped students. For example, at the University of Minnesota, a
campus containing some 300 buildings and a student body of 55,600, it has been esti-
mated that compliance with § 504 will cost $7.2 million dollars. N.Y. Times, Dec. 4,
1977, at 1, col. I. The Department of HEW predicts that $2.4 billion dollars a year
will be required to end handicap discrimination. N.Y. Times, May 1, 1977, at 29, col.
i.
4. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504 provides:
[N]o otherwise qualified handicapped individual . . . shall, solely by reason of
his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
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discriminating against handicapped individuals. With the ever increas-
ing number of applications being filed by the handicapped,6 college offi-
cials were forced to confront the issue of whether admission could be
denied on the basis of a physical impairment. In Southeastern Commu-
nity College v. Davis,7 a case of first impression, the Supreme Court
examined the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, specifically, Section 504, and
HELD: A college instituting reasonable physical admission require-
ments can exclude a deaf individual from entering a clinical nursing
program. Mrs. Francis B. Davis, a qualified, licensed practical nurse
(LPN) sought to advance her nursing career and, in March, 1973, ap-
plied for enrollment in Southeastern Community College's Associate
Nursing Program.8 The college accepted Mrs. Davis for the 1973-74
academic year with advancement to the Clinical Nursing Program con-
tingent upon satisfactory academic progress. The following year, the
college informed Mrs. Davis that despite successful completion of her
course, she did not qualify for the clinical portion of the Associate
Nursing Program. The college refused to accept Mrs. Davis solely be-
cause of a hearing impairment.9
be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance . . . 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976).
5. Section 504 applies to every recipient of federal financial assistance regardless
of the amount or type of assistance received. This applies to recipients of federal
grants, contracts, and other forms of financial assistance. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3 (f) and (h)
(1979).
6. The problems of integrating handicapped individuals into society are com-
pounded by the lack of accurate statistics on the handicapped. "The difficulty in ob-
taining accurate and meaningful statistics is attributable to the inability of statisticians
to measure the effect of a defined handicap on the capacity of the handicapped to
function normally in society". Note, Abroad in the Land: Legal Strategies to Effectu-
ate thfights of the Physi cally Disabled, 61 GEO. L.J. 1501 n.2 (1973). Estimates of
the number of handicapped Americans range from twenty million by the Department
of Labor to thirty-five million by the Department of HEW. See Statement of Joseph
A. Califano, Sec., Dept. HEW (Apr. 29, 1977).
7. 99 S.Ct. 2361 (1979).
8. As part of Mrs. Davis' application, she submitted a pre-entrance Medical Re-
cord, in which the examining physician evaluated her as ". . . mentally and physically
able to undertake the program in professional nursing". Brief for Respondent at 5,
Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 99 S.Ct. 2361 (1979).
9. Id. at 6. Mrs. Davis was interviewed twice, once in April, 1973, and again in
March, 1974, as part of Southeastern's evaluation process. As a result of these inter-
views, the College requested that Mrs. Davis submit to a hearing examination. The
2
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Thereafter, Mrs. Davis requested that the college reevaluate her
application. After agreeing to do so, the college sought outside profes-
sional opinions as to the effect of a hearing impairment on Mrs. Davis'
prospective career. The college consulted the Executive Director of
North Carolina's Board of Nursing, who responded unfavorably to the
licensing of a deaf woman as a registered nurse (RN): "Mrs. Davis'
hearing impairment can preclude her from being safe for practice in
any setting allowed by a license as a[n] RN or by license as a[n]
LPN."'0 [emphasis added]. The Director of Nursing Services at South-
eastern General Hospital, where Mrs. Davis had previously been em-
ployed, stated, in contrast, that: "I would employ Mrs. Davis in our
Skilled Nursing Facility as an RN if I had a vacancy . . ."." Further-
more, the director remarked: "I do not believe that I can truthfully
state that she [Mrs. Davis] would not be able to function in any area of
nursing with her present determination to continue her education. '"'
After weighing the merits of each assessment, the college again
rejected her application. 3 In response, Mrs. Davis filed suit alleging,
inter alia,"4 a violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.' 5 After
audiologist's report revealed that Mrs. Davis had a bilateral moderately severe sensori-
neural hearing loss. However, with a change in her hearing aid, it was expected that
Mrs. Davis would be able to detect sound ". . . almost as well as a person would who
has normal hearing." Id. at 6. Nevertheless, no new interviews were scheduled with
Mrs. Davis with her new hearing aid. Instead the College rejected Mr. Davis as not
qualified.
10. Id. at 7. The Executive Director of the North Carolina Board of Nursing,
evidently, did not know that Mrs. Davis had been licensed by the Board as an LPN
and had worked for many years.
11. Id. at 7.
12. Id. at 8.
13. Id.
14. Mrs. Davis filed suit based on the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504, 29
U.S.C. § 794 (1976), and under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
Mrs. Davis alleged that Southeastern, in denying her admission solely on account of
her hearing impairment, denied her due process and equal protection of the law. The
district court disposed of the 1983 claim by noting that Mrs. Davis had failed to ex-
haust all administrative remedies. 424 F.Supp. 1341 (E.D.N.C. 1976). See also
Burgdorf & Burgdorf, A History of Unequal Treatment. The Qualifications of Handi-
capped Persons as a Suspect Class under the Equal Protection Clause, 15 SANTA
CLARA LAWYER 855 (1975).
15. Mrs. Davis claimed that the College, by denying her admission to the clinical
program on account of her hearing disability and by failing to make accommodations
311 11 4:1980
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a bench trial, the district court concluded that Mrs. Davis was not
within the class covered by Section 504 and ruled in favor of the col-
lege."6 Using the plain meaning approach to statutory construction, the
district court interpreted Section 504's "otherwise qualified handi-
capped person" to mean a person who is ". . . otherwise able to func-
tion sufficiently in the position sought in spite of the handicap, if
proper training and facilities are suitable and available.117 Thus, Mrs.
Davis was adjudged not "otherwise qualified" since she would not be
able to function sufficiently as an RN with her handicap.'8
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
lower court had erred in its judgment and reversed in part. 9 The panel
did not dispute the findings of fact by the district court but held that
the lower court misconstrued Section 504 since the district court did
not have the benefit of newly promulgated HEW regulations when it
rendered its opinion.2 1 In contrast to the district court's decision, the
for her disability, violated § 504. At trial, Southeastern's witnesses admitted that Mrs.
Davis could perform adequately in the clinical program with special training and indi-
vidual supervision. Brief for Respondent at 8, Southeastern Community College v. Da-
vis, 99 S.Ct. 2361 (1979).
16. 424 F.Supp. 1341 (E.D.N.C. 1976).
17. Id. at 1345. From the decision, it is apparent that the factual context in
which this case arose determined the resolution of the statutory interpretation question.
The court pointed out, first, that Mrs. Davis' abilities would be inadequate to identify
patients' needs or even to pick up clues regarding a patient's vital signs. According to
the Executive Director of North Carolina's Board of Nursing, this fact standing alone
would preclude Mrs. Davis from being licensed. Second, this projected inability to be
licensed as a Registered Nurse in the state of North Carolina was the single major
factor in the College's refusal to allow admission. And third, according to the court, it
would have been difficult and even dangerous for Mrs. Davis, as a deaf student, to
attempt the clinical portion of the training program.
18. Id. The district court finalized its decision with an analogy that, while it
would be impermissable to exclude a blind or deaf person from admission to law
school, if academically qualified, it would nevertheless be permissible to exclude a per-
son without sight from a position as a truck driver.
19. 574 F.2d 1158 (4th Cir. 1978). The Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court's opinion as to Mrs. Davis' claim under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1976). However, the denial of Mrs. Davis' claim under the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973 was vacated and remanded.
20. Id. at 1161. Approximately six months after the district court's decision, on
June 3, 1977, HEW Regulations implementing § 504 became effective. These Regula-
tions establish a mechanism for prohibiting discriminatory practices aimed at the hand-
icapped, as mandated by the Rehabilitation Act. The Regulations define a "qualified
4
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court of appeals gave due deference to such administrative
regulations.2'
The district court was consequently ordered to Teconsider Mrs.
Davis' application for admission without regard to her disability. The
panel asserted that the college might use academic performance as a
factor in evaluating an applicant's qualification; however, any factor
considered must be used uniformly regardless of its objective or subjec-
tive nature.2 Furthermore, the court noted that Mrs. Davis should not
be foreclosed from pursuing a nursing career merely because she is un-
able to function effectively in all aspects of the nursing profession. Al-
though Mrs. Davis' handicap might preclude her from working in a
hospital's operating theatre, where surgical masks would prevent any
reliance upon reading lips, there was no basis for prohibiting Mrs. Da-
vis from working in another setting, such as private industry.23 The
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded and directed the lower
court to pay "close attention" to the HEW regulations 2 -requiring the
college to modify its program to accommodate Mrs. Davis-even
though such compliance may entail considerable expense.25 From this
ruling, Southeastern filed its petition for writ of certiorari to the Su-
preme Court. 26
handicapped person", with regard to post secondary education, as a "handicapped per-
son who meets the academic and technical standards requisite to admission or partici-
pation." 45 C.F.R. § 84.3 (k) (3) (1979). Technical standards are considered as "all
non-academic admissions criteria that are essential to participation in the program in
question." 45 C.F.R. App. A (1979).
21. Id. at 1161. Thorpe v. Housing Auth., 393 U.S. 268 (1969); Cort v. Ash, 422
U.S. 66 (1975); Bradley v. Richmond School Bd., 416 U.S. 696 (1974). Other courts of
appeals were required to vacate and remand cases, under § 504, to lower tribunals for
reconsideration in light of applicable regulations which postdated their decisions. See
United Handicapped Fed'n, 558 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1977); Lloyd v. Regional Transp.
Auth., 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977).
22. 574 F.2d at 1160.
23. Id. at 1161.
24. 45 C.F.R. § 84.42(a) (1979); as per §§ 84.43(c), 84.44(a), 84.44(d) and
84.12(a). See text accompanying notes 57-62, infra.
In its remand, the 4th Circuit Court, rather than ordering the implementation of
modifications mandated by the regulations, only recommended that the above regula-
tions be examined. See 574 F.2d at 1162, n. 8, 1163, n. 9. Arguably, this procedural
move weakened the lower tribunal's deference to such regulations.
25. 574 F.2d at 1162-63.
26. Id. at 1163. Southeastern filed a petition for rehearing and suggestion for
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Accepting the case for review, 7 the Supreme Court reversed the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals and remanded.28 Writing for a unani-
mous court, Justice Powell, in an unusually short opinion, held that
Southeastern Community College did not violate Section 504 when it
denied Mrs. Davis admission to the Clinical Nursing Program.
As opposed to the controversy at the trial level, which involved the
determination of Mrs. Davis' status as "otherwise qualified," pursuant
to Section 504, the central issue facing the Supreme Court in the case
at bar was whether Section 504 ". . [forbade] professional schools
from imposing physical requirements for admission to their clinical
program".2 1
Since this was a case of first impression, the Supreme Court was
undoubtedly urged to grant review because of the need for a definitive
statement regarding the interpretation and scope of Section 504. Con-
flicting decisions had blurred the intent and impact of Section 504 on
both public and private educational institutions. Litigation to enroll a
handicapped child stricken with spina bifida 0 in the public schools con-
cluded with contrasting judgments in adjacent circuits.31 In the fourth
circuit, after the Davis district court decision, a different point of view
was taken by two district courts in holding that a college must provide
rehearing en banc. The suggestion failed despite a request for a poll of the judges. Two
judges dissented to the denial of rehearing en banc and would have affirmed the district
court's judgment.
27. 574 F.2d 1158 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 99 S.Ct. 830 (1979).
28. 99 S.Ct. at 2371.
29. Id. at 2364.
30. DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY, 1451 (25th ed. 1974), de-
fines spina bifida as " . . . a developmental anomaly characterized by a defective clo-
sure of the bony encasement of the spinal cord through which the cord and meninges
may . . . protrude". In certain cases, this structural defect entails an inability to con-
trol the bladder and bowel. See also S. TUREK, ORTHOPAEDICS: PRINCIPLES AND THEIR
APPLICATION 869-73 (2d ed. 1967).
31. Compare Hairston v. Drosick, 423 F.Supp. 180 (S.D.W.Va. 1976), (exclu-
sion of child from regular classroom without a bona fide educational reason is a viola-
tion of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504); with Sherer v. Waier, 457 F.Supp. 1039
(W.D.Mo. 1978), (parents, individually, and on behalf of their daughter who suffered
from spina bifida, could not assert a private right of action under § 504 against school
officials for failure to provide special individual medical services to the child during
school).
6
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interpreter services under Section 504 for deaf students.2 Furthermore,
other areas of daily living were becoming embroiled in litigation as a
result of the Rehabilitation Act.3
The federal commitment to eradicating discrimination against dis-
abled persons had been piecemeal and sketchy, at best, until the enact-
ment of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Initial congressional interest
began with returning World War I veterans and their attendant reha-
bilitative needs. The concern for both disabled war veterans and their
civilian counterparts (primarily handicapped industrial workers) led to
the Vocational Rehabilitation Program enacted in 1920 when President
Woodrow Wilson signed into law the Smith-Fess Act.3 This act of-
fered limited vocational services .3 As the definition of "handicapped"
evolved from the foundation laid in the Smith-Fess Act, a definition
which did not include the mentally ill or mentally retarded, and as the
number of those eligible increased, the nature of services provided cor-
respondingly changed .3 This development, however, was negligible as
32. Barnes v. Converse College, 436 F.Supp. 635 (D.S.C. 1977); Crawford v.
Univ. of N.C., 440 F.Supp. 1047 (M.D.N.C. 1977).
33. In the 7th and 8th Circuits, the purchase of public transportation buses with-
out hydraulic lifts and wheelchair securing devices was held to be handicap discrimina-
tion, in violation of § 504. Yet, in the 10th Circuit, similar handicap discrimination was
found not to be a violation of the Rehabilitation Act. Compare Lloyd v. Regional
Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977); United Handicapped Fed'n v. Andre,
558 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1977); with Atlantis Community, Inc. v. Adams, 453 F.Supp.
825 (1975).
Compare Kampmeier v. Nyquist, 553 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1977), (students with vi-
sion in only one eye denied preliminary injunction to participate in contact sports) with
Borden v. Rohr, No. C2 75-844 (S.D.Ohio Dec. 30, 1975) (in an oral decision the court
granted a preliminary injunction to allow a state university student, blind in one eye, to
play intercollegiate basketball), and Evans v. Looney, No. 77-6052-CV-SJ (W.D.Mo.
1977), (refusal to permit plaintiffs blind in one eye the right to participate in college
football held to be both a denial of due process and equal protection).
34. Vocational Rehabilitation (Smith-Fess) Act of 1920, Pub. L. No. 66-236, 29
U.S.C. §§ 31-42 (1970).
35. The Smith-Fess Act initially offered only services for the physically handi-
capped, such as counseling, some training, and placement services. The Vocational Re-
habilitation Program was considered a temporary measure which was loosely funded
until the passage of the Social Security Act in 1935. Pub. L. No. 74-271, 42 U.S.C. §
301 (1976). Therein Congress allocated permanent funding. See [1973] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2076, 2082.
36. Due to the impact of World War II, Congress amended the Vocational Re-
0
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the Act focused mainly on vocational rehabilitation training without
addressing the aspects of discrimination which confronted trained
handicapped individuals.
Initial recognition of social bias against the disabled began in 1948
when Congress enacted a law prohibiting the Federal Civil Service
from discriminating against any person due to a physical handicap."
Continuing with these efforts, in 1971, an attempt was launched to in-
corporate the handicapped within the provisions of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.38 However, not until early 1972, during the 92nd Congress, did
extensive debate begin on providing handicapped individuals with more
comprehensive rehabilitative services, including civil rights
protections. 9
That year, the House Committee on Education and Labor re-
sponded to problems inherent in the Vocational Rehabilitation Pro-
gram by submitting H.R. 8395,40 which passed both houses of Congress
by October, 1972. However, during that same month, President Nixon
announced his pocket veto of the bill. 1 Following the 1972-73 Christ-
mas recess, the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare re-
vised a version of the previous house bill which passed both the Senate
and House. 2 On March 27, 1973, President Nixon vetoed bill S.7, de-
habilitation Act in 1943 to provide medical services for reducing or eliminating an
individual's disability and expanded the definition of "handicapped" to include the
mentally ill and retarded. Vocational Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1943, Pub. L.
No. 78-113. The 1954 amendments added new federal funding techniques for state re-
habilitative services (Pub. L. No. 83-565). In 1965, further amendments (Pub. L. No.
89-333) expanded the program and liberalized federal funding to encourage matching
state appropriations. The medicare provisions of the Social Security Act made funds
available for rehabilitative services for the elderly. In 1967, a major reorganization in
HEW developed the Bureau of Social and Rehabilitative Services. In 1968, Congress
extended the act to include follow-up services, services to families, construction of re-
habilitation facilities, and employment opportunities for the handicapped. (Pub. L. No.
90-341). See [1973] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2076, 2082-84.
37. Civil Service Act, 22 Stat. 403 (1883) as amended by the Civil Service Act
Amendment of 1948, Pub. L. No. 48-617, 62 Stat. 351, 5 U.S.C. § 7153 (1970).
38. 119 Cong. Rec. 7114 (1973) (remarks of Rep. Vanik).
39. See S.REP. No. 318, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1973] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2076, 2078.
40. Id. at 2087.
41. Id.
42. Id.
1 316 4:1980 1
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nouncing Congress as masking "bad legislation beneath alluding la-
bels.14 3 Although both presidential vetoes centered on the cost of the
proposed legislation, the President also objected to the legislation's di-
vergence from strictly vocational objectives.4
After a final attempt by the Senate to override the President's
veto,4" members of the Labor and Public Welfare Committee met with
administrative officials to work out a compromise. 6 An amended ver-
sion of the two previously vetoed bills was quietly adopted by both
House and Senate. Thus, with little debate or commentary,47 Congress
passed the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.11
With the passage of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Federal
Government undertook a comprehensive program, the effects of which
would ultimately open the door to equality for the nation's handi-
capped.49 The greatest impact for the handicapped lies within three sec-
tions of Title V of the Act: Section 501,50 mandating non-discrimina-
tion by the Federal Government in its own hiring practices; Section
503,51 prohibiting discrimination and requiring affirmative action on the
43. Id. at 2088.
44. Id. at 2088-89. See also 119 CONG. REC. 7107 (1973) (remarks of Rep.
Landgrebe).
45. On April 3, 1973, the Senate failed to override the President's veto. The vote
was sixty (60) in favor to override and thirty-six (36) against. 119 CONG. REC. 10822
(1973).
46. [1973] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 2082.
47 "[C]ongress enacted the legislation without legislative hearing and virtually
no floor debate in either house. There is thus little Congressional guidance on the host
of complex questions presented by § 504's far-reaching prohibition against discrimina-
tion." Statement of Joseph A. Califano, Sec., Dept. HEW (Apr. 29, 1977).
48. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (1976), as amended. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973
repealed all the provisions and amendments of the Vocational Rehabilitation Act and
substituted its own provisions. 29 U.S.C. § 790 (1976). See also, A Legislative History
of Section 504, in 2 AMicus 34 (1977).
49. See, e.g., Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 411 F.Supp. 982 (E.D.Pa. 1976), affd,
556 F.2d 184 (3rd Cir. 1977), (denial to a blind woman of employment as a school
teacher was discrimination in employment and contrary to § 504); Davis v. Bucher, 451
F.Supp. 791 (E.D.Pa. 1978), (the denial of public employment to applicants with histo-
ries of drug abuse held to violate § 504).
50. 29 U.S.C. § 791 (1976).
51. 29 U.S.C. § 793 (1976). For a comparison of § 503 and § 504, see Ochoa,
Sections 503 & 504: New Employment Rights for Individuals with Handicaps, 2
AMIcus 38 (1977).
I
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part of federal contractors who receive more than $2,500 in contracts;
and Section 504,82 which prohibits discrimination against handicapped
individuals in any federally funded program or activity. Hence,
whereas previous legislation centered on the very limited goal of pro-
viding strictly vocational services, Title V of the Rehabilitation Act of-
fered, for the first time, specific civil rights protections by barring the
expenditure of federal funds in programs discriminating against the
handicapped.'3
As initially passed, Section 504 consisted of a single sentence, un-
accompanied by any explanation concerning its scope of coverage or
limitations. Congressional intent was simply to enact a provision
prohibiting discrimination against the handicapped in programs receiv-
ing federal funds.54 Congress later amended the act,5" broadening its
52. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976). See, Comment, Toward Equal Rights for Handi-
capped Individuals: Judicial Enforcement of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 38
OHIO ST. L.J. 677 (1977).
53. "[Slection 504 was patterned after, and is almost identical to, the anti-dis-
crimination language of Section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000d-
1, relating to race, color, or national origin . . ." S. Rep. No. 1297, 93rd Cong., 1st
Sess., reprinted in [19741 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6373, 6390. In the 1978
Amendments to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 95-602, 92 Stat. 2982, 29
U.S.C. § 794 (1976 & Supp. 11 1979), § 504 states that the rights and procedures con-
tained in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VI and VII, § 717 and § 706 (f) through
706 (k), are included in § 501, and § 504. In addition, legislation has been enacted to
amend Title VII of the Civil Rights Act to prohibit discrimination against the handi-
capped. See S.446, H.R. 373, and S.346 (9th Cong., 1979) in 3 M.D.L.R. 119, 123
(1979).
54. The Senate Report accompanying the 1973 Act shows § 504". . . proclaim-
ing a policy of nondiscrimination against otherwise qualified handicapped individuals
with respect to participation in or access to any program which is in receipt of Federal
financial assistance". S.Rep. No. 318, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1973] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2076, 2123. After the HEW Regulations for § 504 were
issued, Congress amended the section and added new subsections providing for attor-
neys fees, expert consultation on architectual barriers, and a council to review new
regulations. The Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabili-
ties Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (a), (b), & (c) (1976 & Supp. II
1979).
55. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 706 (6) (1976) as amended by
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-651 (Nov. 20,
1974), 89 Stat. 2-3 (1974). Before this amendment, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
defined "handicapped individual" as:
Any individual who (A) has a physical or mental disability which for such indi-
1 318
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scope of eligibility by redefining "handicapped" to include one who:
A. Has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one
or more of such person's major life activities,
B. Has a record of such an impairment, or
C. Is regarded as having such an impairment."
The protection afforded this expanded class of handicapped individuals
is modified, to a certain degree, by the HEW interpretative regulations
pertaining to the Act."
The Rehabilitation Act does not specify enforcement procedures
since Congress intended HEW to promulgate regulations in this area.
Swift implementation of such regulations was anticipated." Yet, four
years passed before the Secretary of HEW, after considerable hesita-
tion,59 issued the regulations."
vidual constitutes or results in a substantial handicap to employment and (B) can
reasonably be expected to benefit in terms of employability from vocational re-
habilitation services provided pursuant to subchapters I and III of this chapter.
29 U.S.C. § 706(6) (1970 & Supp. 11 1973). This definition in effect limited § 504 to
disabled persons capable of employment through vocational rehabilitation.
56. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 706 (6) (1976).
57. The HEW Regulations implementing § 504 define "qualified handicapped
person", in the employment context, as ". . . a handicapped person who, with reason-
able accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the job in question". 45
C.F.R. § 84.3 (k) (1) (1979). In contrast, regarding post secondary education, a "quali-
fied handicapped person" means a" . . . handicapped person #ho meets the academic
and technical standards requisite to admission or participation in the recipient's educa-
tion program or activity." 45 C.F.R. § 84.3 (k) (3) (1979). The Regulations use the
term "qualified handicapped person" and "otherwise qualified handicapped person"
synonymously. HEW considered that the omission of the word "otherwise" was neces-
sary in order to conform with the intention of the statute, because" . . . read literally,
otherwise qualified handicapped persons include persons who are qualified except for
their handicap, rather than in spite of their handicap. Under such a literal reading, a
blind person possessing all the qualifications for driving a bus except sight could be
said to be 'otherwise qualified' ". 45 C.F.R. § 84 App. A at 376 (1977).
58. S.Rep. No. 1297, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 6373, 6390.
59. In April, 1976, President Gerald R. Ford ordered HEW to"... coordinate
the implementation of § 504. . . by all Federal departments and agencies. . . so that
consistent policies, practices, and procedures are adopted with respect to the enforce-
ment of § 504 . . . " Exec. Order No. 11,914, 3 C.F.R. § 117 (1976). In Cherry v.
Mathews, 419 F.Supp. 922 (D.D.C. 1976), District Court Judge John Lewis Smith
14:1980 319 1
I
11
et al.: Retreat of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973: Southeastern Community
Published by NSUWorks, 1980
Throughout the regulations, it is clear that emphasis is placed
upon evaluating handicapped individuals on the basis of their qualifica-
tions and not on their disabilities. In education, preadmission inquiries
into an applicant's handicap are prohibited. After admission, but
before enrollment, an institution may consider an applicant's disability
in order to determine what academic adjustments must be made to en-
sure full student participation."1 Academic requiremerits can be modi-
fied, if necessary, to ensure that they do not discriminate, or have the
effect of discriminating against a qualified handicapped student."
In Davis, the Supreme Court analyzed Section 504's language and
found that it neither compels schools to disregard a participant's handi-
cap nor requires them to modify their programs especially for the
handicapped. Section 504 demands only that schools not exclude "oth-
erwise qualified persons" solely on account of their disability. In es-
sence, Section 504 signifies that "mere possession of a handicap is not
a permissible ground for assuming an inability to function in a particu-
lar context." 3
The question of whether Section 504 allows an aggrieved handi-
capped person a private right of action was not answered by the court.
Justice Powell acknowledged the issue in a footnote, but declined to
ordered HEW to promulgate regulations implementing § 504 without undue delay.
Nevertheless, HEW Sec. Mathews refused to issue the final regulations until Congress
reviewed them. Judge Smith considered holding Mathews in contempt, but an appeal
of the order gave Mathews enough time to avoid issuing the regulations before the
inauguration of the Carter administration. Additional postponement provoked Handi-
cap Rights' organizations to stage demonstrations and occupy various federal offices in
an attempt to publicize the delay. See "Hire the Handicapped", NEWSWEEK, May 9,
1977 at 39.
60. In announcing the Regulations, Sec. Califano declared, "In sum, the regula-
tions issued today reflects my best judgment of how Congress intended that the broad
uncompromising statutory command of § 504 should be translated into specific rules
that vindicate the rights of handicapped citizens and that deal firmly, yet sensibly with
those recipients of federal funds who will be subjected to significant new require-
ments". Statement of Joseph A. Califano, Sec., Dept. HEW (Apr. 29, 1979).
61. 45 C.F.R. § 84.42 (b) (4) (1979).
62. 45 C.F.R. § 84.44 (a) and (d) (1979). Such modifications may include
changes in the length of time permitted for the completion of degree requirements,
substitution of specific courses required for the completion of degree requirements, and
the use of auxiliary educational aids, i.e., typewriters, tape recorders, and print
enlargers.
63. 99 S.Ct. at 2366.
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address the problem in light of the court's disposition of the case, i.e.
finding Mrs. Davis not "otherwise qualified" and thus not entitled to
protection under the Act." It is interesting to note that although the
court meandered their way out of addressing this point, they still heard
Mrs. Davis' claim under Section 504.11 Eight circuits which have con-
sidered the issue have found a private right of action to exist.6"
Moreover, the Supreme Court reassessed the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals definition of an "otherwise qualified" handicapped person; a
definition which regarded a person as "otherwise qualified" if, regard-
less of their respective handicap, such person met the academic and
technical standards requisite for admission. The Supreme Court per-
ceived this to mean that one need not meet legitimate physical require-
ments in order to be adjudged "otherwise qualified." Justice Powell
64. 99 S.Ct. 2361, 2366 n.5.
65. Supra note 14, at 14.
66. Aggrieved individuals first secured a private right of action under § 504 in
Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977), wherein the court
enjoined local authorities from purchasing buses that were inaccessible to the physi-
cally handicapped. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals relied on Lau v. Nichols, 414
U.S. 563 (1973) and Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975) to hold that 504 confers affirma-
tive rights on handicapped individuals and, in addition, a private right of action to
enforce these rights.
See NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 599 F.2d 1247 (3rd Cir. 1979) (minority
groups and handicapped rights associations were given a private right of action under §
504 to contest relocation of medical facility); Doe v. Colautti, 592 F.2d 704 (3rd Cir.
1979) (mentally ill patient seeking state benefits in a private hospital has private right
of action under § 504); Davis v. Southeastern Community College, 574 F.2d 1158 (4th
Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, (1979) (deaf LPN seeking RN degree has a private
right of action under § 504); United Handicapped Fed'n v. Andre, 558 F.2d 413 (8th
Cir. 1977) (mobility-handicapped individuals and association of disabled persons have
a private right of action under § 504 to enjoin public transportation system from
purchasing mass transit equipment that is inacessible to handicapped persons);
Kampmeier v. Nyquist, 553 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1977) (students blind in one eye were
allowed to claim a private right of action to enjoin a denial of participation in contact
sports); Leary v. Crapsey, 566 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1977) (Per curiam) (mobility-handi-
capped persons have a private right of action under § 504 to bring suit for an accessible
bus transportation system); Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 556 F.2d 184 (3rd Cir. 1977)
(blind teacher seeking public school position conferred private right of action under §
504); Contra: Trageser v. Libbie Rehabilitation Center, Inc., 590 F2d 87 (4th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 99 S.Ct. 2895 (1979) (RN with deteriorating eyesight, terminated
from nursing home position, denied a private right of action). See also Comment, To-
ward Equal Rights for Handicapped Individuals, supra, note 52.
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took exception to this view. He believed that the district court's inter-
pretation of "otherwise qualified", requiring disabled individuals to sat-
isfy all requirements in spite of their handicap, more accurately re-
flected the true statutory meaning.67 This position, Powell reasoned, is
supported by the HEW regulations which implement the Act. Such
regulations mandate that a handicapped student meet academic and
technical standards requisite for admission or participation. 8 If physi-
cal qualifications are essential to a particular program, "technical stan-
da'rds" for admission may encompass reasonable physical require-
ments. Thus, a qualified handicapped person would need to meet
academic, technical, and physical requirements.
Another issue under consideration by the Supreme Court con-
cerned the appellate court's ruling requiring the college to modify its
programs and provide auxillary aids to facilitate participation by the
handicapped. This requirement was held to be excessive. Justice Powell
observed, first of all, that despite program modifications, Mrs. Davis
would not likely benefit to the same degree as a nonhandicapped par-
ticipant. Moreover, any interpretation of the regulations requiring sub-
stantial adjustments beyond those necessary to eliminate discrimination
against "otherwise qualified" handicapped individuals, "would consti-
tute an unauthorized extension of the obligations imposed by that stat-
ute." 9 Secondly, Section 504 is silent as to matters of affirmative ac-
tion, in direct contrast to Sections 501 and 503, both of which contain
explicit language authorizing affirmative action.79 Therefore, the court
reasoned that Congress intended to limit affirmative action to certain
circumstances prescribed by the Act. HEW, through its regulations,
cannot create an obligation not otherwise provided for under Section
504. Even though an administrative agency's interpretation is to be
given some deference, "neither the language, purpose, nor history, of
Section 504 reveals an intent to impose an affirmative action obligation
on all recipients of federal funds. [Emphasis added]."'7
67. 99 S.Ct. at 2369.
68. See notes 61 and 62 and accompanying text, supra.
69. 99 S.Ct. at 2369.
70. See Note, Rehabilitating the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 58 B.U.L. Rev.
247, 252-54 (1978).
71. 99 S.Ct. at 2369. The Solicitor General of the United States, in an amicus
curiae brief for the respondent, cited congressional reports and statements by individ-
ual members of Congress during the 1978 amendm6nts debate, in support of the argu-
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The Supreme Court's decision, in the instant case, holding that the
college's actions were not in anywise discriminatory, was based on a
narrow interpretation of Section 504. The ramifications of such an in-
terpretation are far-reaching. Justice Powell contended that there
would be situations where modifications could be made accommodat-
ing the handicapped without imposing "undue financial and adminis-
trative burdens".72 Refusal to modify in those circumstances would be
considered unreasonable and discriminatory. However, in the present
case, such a refusal was not considered discriminatory, as Mrs. Davis
could not have fully participated on account of hearing impairment.
The court did not establish any guidelines in this regard, and only as-
serted that ". . . the line between illegal handicap discrimination and
lawful refusal to extend affirmative action will [not] always be clear. '73
Consequently, the handicap provision of Section 504 was determined
not to "limit the freedom of an educational institution to require rea-
sonable physical qualifications for admission to a clinical training
program."74
Davis is a major setback for both the Federal Government and the
Handicap Rights Organizations, whose efforts were instrumental in* en-
acting the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The Court's decision allowing
the consideration of physical admission requirements circumvents Sec-
tion 504's regulations prohibiting preadmission inquiry into an appli-
cant's handicap.75 If physical ability, such as hearing or sight, is consid-
ered an admission requirement, an applicant could be excluded at the
outset of the admission process, regardless of whether or not some aca-
demic adjustment could be made which would enable a student to ef-
fectively participate. For example, since law materials are printed and
not usually found in Braille, law schools could require sight as either a
technical or physical requirement, and exclude all blind applicants.
Clearly HEW intended to prohibit such preadmission handicap
ment that § 504 entails affirmative action. See United States of America, Amicus Cu-
riae Brief, Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 99 S.Ct. 2361 (1979). Justice
Powell, however, asserted that since these statements were all made after the enact-
ment of the Rehabilitation Act, they were not proper expressions of legislatvie intent.
99 S.Ct. 2361, 2370 n.11.
72. 99 S.Ct. at 2370.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 2371.
75. See note 60 and accompanying text, supra.
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inquiries.
Davis represents but another "handicap rights" decision founded
on considerations of safety and cost.78 The safety of both Mrs. Davis,
practicing as an RN and of any potential patients under her care, over-
shadowed the controversy of handicap discrimination." The court
opined that Mrs. Davis' handicap prevented her from safely rendering
adequate nursing services. Unfortunately, this decision ignores the con-
tributions made by many hearing-impaired persons performing safely
and effectively in society, such as doctors, nurses, and dentists.78 Ad-
vances in medical technology have enabled many hearing-impaired reg-
istered nurses and doctors to care for their patients without risk or
jeopardy. 79 Furthermore, the concern for handicapped workers' safety
has too often been a myth used by employers to reject qualified handi-
capped workers."0
Along these lines, federal courts have recognized that cost is not a
justification for denying equal education to handicapped children,8 1 nor
is it grounds for preventing public transportation for handicapped per-
sons."2 It seems illogical, then, to exclude a handicapped applicant from
professional education programs because of "undue financial
burdens".3
Powell's decision has greatly emasculated the opportunity for ad-
76. See, e.g., Barnes v. Converse College, 436 F. Supp. at 638; S. Dubow, Liti-
gation for the Rights of the Handicapped People, 4 DePaul L.R. 943 (1978).
77. See 3 M.D.LR. 190 (1979).
78. The U.s. Civil Service Commission Report, Employment of Handicapped
Individuals Including Disabled Veterans in the Federal Government (Sept. 30, 1978),
found over 150 hearing-impaired nurses working for the Federal Government.
79. E.g., an electronic amplifying stethescope -to hear lung sounds; a
sphygomonometer to measure blood pressure; teletypewriters. See also Ridden, Davis,
and Brown, Science for Handicapped Students in Higher Education, American Associ-
ation for the Advancement of Science, (AAAS) pub. 78-R-2 (1978).
80. The myth that handicapped workers present additional safety hazards has
been disproven in practice. See Sears, The Able Disabled, CHEMTECH, 713-15, (Dec.
1974); Kalenik, Myths About Hiring the Physically Handicapped, 2 JOB SAFETY AND
HEALTH 9 (1974).
81. See Mills v. Bd. of Educ. of the District of Columbia, 348 F.Supp. 866
(D.D.C. 1972).
82. See Bartels v. Niernat, 427 F.Supp. 226 (E.D.Wisc. 1977); United Handicap
Fed'n v. Andre, supra, note 66.
83. 99 S.Ct. at 2370.
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vancement in professional schools by the nation's handicapped."
Southeastern Community College, assisted by numerous amici curiae,
was successful in diverting the court's attention away from the issue of
handicap discrimination by emphasizing the necessity of physical quali-
fications for admission. One amicus rashly asserted that sustaining the
appellate court would entail colleges admitting ". . . the profoundly
mentally retarded to graduate programs or the quadraplegic to forestry
programs."' Such an extremist view in all probability played a decisive
role in guiding the court to its decision.
A final point must be made regarding the Act's purported guaran-
tee of civil rights protections to the handicapped. The Supreme Court
seems to have underscored that purpose in its review of Mrs. Davis'
allegation of such discrimination. It appears that the court, in essence,
perceived Mrs. Davis' status as being akin to the "profoundly mentally
retarded [in graduate programs] or the quadraplegic [in forestry pro-
grams]." 6 This decision raises the question of whether a blind or deaf
individual is less of a citizen with fewer rights because of his or her
disability. Davis emphasizes the discrimination, demeaning practices,
and injustices that must be overcome by those Americans burdened
with mental or physical impairments.
Clyde Mabry Collins, Jr.
84. The language in Davis suggests that the holding is confined to professional
training programs having reasonable and essential physical requirements. Those being
unable to meet such physical prerequisites, despite their respective qualifications or
skills, would be foreclosed from pursuing professional careers.
85. The Association of American Colleges, Amicus Curiae Brief, at 7, South-
eastern Community College v. Davis, 99 S.Ct. 2361 (1979).
86. Id.
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